USA v. Robert Birch by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-26-2015 
USA v. Robert Birch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Robert Birch" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 82. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/82 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-2368 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT J. BIRCH 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY, 
  
                            Robert J. Birch, 
                                     Appellant 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 2-10-cv-01212) 
District Judge:  Honorable Norma L. Shapiro 
       
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on April 10, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 26, 2015) 
   
 
O P I N I O N*  
   
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
_______________________ 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the fill Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In this case, the District Court awarded $107,930.35, plus post-judgment interest, 
to the United States Department of Education (DOE).  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
I. Background 
DOE filed a civil action in the District Court against Robert J. Birch to recover 
payments for a consolidated student loan executed by Birch in February 1996.  The loan 
was guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority (PHEAA), 
and reinsured by DOE.  Birch defaulted on the loan in May 1996, after failing to make 
payments for six months.  In September 2002, Birch and PHEAA settled a suit agreeing 
that PHEAA would rehabilitate the loan if Birch made twelve consecutive monthly 
payments of $600.  Birch made twelve payments over the span of fourteen months, 
missing two payments, causing PHEAA not to rehabilitate the loan and to resume 
attempts to collect on the debt.  After failing to collect the debt from Birch, PHEAA 
assigned the loan to DOE in July 2007.   
When DOE did not succeed in collecting the debt, it filed this suit.  Birch then 
impleaded PHEAA for allegedly breaching the prior settlement agreement.  The District 
Court held a bench trial to determine the correct amount owed on the loan and how much 
Birch had paid, collection costs owed, whether Birch successfully rehabilitated his loan 
after it was in default, and whether the outstanding loan payments were due to DOE or 
PHEAA.  After the bench trial, the court appointed a certified public accountant as a 
special master to review the transcript and submit a report.  The parties had an 
opportunity to question the special master at a hearing on March 21, 2013. 
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In the court’s findings of fact, it determined that between the time of default and 
the assignment to DOE, PHEAA collected $45,280.35 from Birch, applying $7,663.43 to 
collection costs and $37,601.92 to interest.  The principal amount of $60,689.73 was 
never reduced.  After assignment, Birch paid another $2,232.00 to DOE.  The District 
Court found that the payments made to PHEAA and DOE were properly applied first to 
collection costs and second to interest, according to DOE regulations, see 34 C.F.R. § 
682.404(f).  As of September 21, 2009, Birch owed the principal of $60,689.73 plus 
$27,552.94 in interest, for a total of $88,242.67.  Interest has continued to accrue while 
the suit has been pending.  At the time of judgment, the court found that Birch owed 
$107,930.35 plus post-judgment interest. 
II. Discussion 
Birch raises a number of issues on appeal, many of which are based in factual 
claims that are unsupported by either the record or the findings of the District Court.  To 
the extent Birch seeks to prevail based on different facts, he is challenging the factual 
findings of the District Court, which we review for clear error.  CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 
734 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2013).  Birch, however, directly challenges the factual 
findings of the District Court in only two instances, arguing that it was error for the court 
to ignore both Birch’s $47,000 in payments and a mailing from PHEAA to Birch, stating 
that he was doing a “good job” and was on his way to loan rehabilitation. With respect to 
the payments, the court did not ignore Birch’s payments but rather acknowledged them 
specifically as discussed above.   
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Regarding the “good job” mailing, Birch argues that PHEAA breached its 2002 
settlement agreement with him.  The District Court found that Birch had not satisfied the 
conditions under which PHEAA would be required to perform, namely that he make 
twelve consecutive monthly payments.  Therefore, PHEAA was not in breach.  See In re 
Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A contracting party’s failure 
to fulfill a condition excuses the performance by the other party whose performance is so 
conditioned . . ..”).  Birch argued that he did not fail to perform because the contract in 
one place stated that payments should be made “not less more [sic] than 30 days apart.”  
As the District Court noted, Birch’s argument that this meant the payments must be 
farther than 30 days apart is both unsupported by the context of the rest of the settlement 
agreement’s language and creates the absurd result that the time between payments would 
be uncapped.  Therefore, PHEAA’s “good job” card was simply irrelevant.  As the 
remainder of the factual findings have not been challenged, and no error is asserted, we 
accept the District Court’s factual findings as given. 
Next, Birch contends that the District Court erred by depriving him of his Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  “We review the district court’s denial of the request for 
a jury trial for abuse of discretion.”  U.S. S.E.C. v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 195 
(3d Cir. 2000).  Although Birch did demand a jury trial in his third party complaint, he 
did not object to the numerous occasions on which the District Court stated that it would 
try the case.  “[O]nce a party makes a timely demand for a jury trial, that party 
subsequently waives that right when it participates in a bench trial without objection.” 
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Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 379 (3d Cir. 1998).  Birch has thus waived 
this objection. 
Birch also contends that he was not allowed to depose employees of PHEAA and 
DOE, preventing him from adequately preparing for trial.  District courts have broad 
authority to direct discovery and we review a denial of discovery for abuse of discretion.   
Ohntrup v. Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 760 F.3d  290 (3d Cir. 2014).  Here, 
the District Court granted PHEAA a protective order precluding the depositions Birch 
sought of the President and CEO of PHEAA.  Birch further sought depositions of other 
corporate designees of both PHEAA and DOE.  In a discovery hearing on March 29, 
2011, the court denied all outstanding requests for discovery, in favor of a new discovery 
schedule that focused on documents first.  The court noted that Birch sought depositions 
of employees who would first have to find the relevant documents and would have no 
personal knowledge of the events.  The court determined that paper discovery should be 
completed before oral depositions.  At the pretrial conference, the court stated that the 
parties had thirty days to request further discovery.  Though Birch acknowledged that he 
understood, he never made such a request.  Thus, Birch was not prevented from deposing 
witnesses; he merely failed to do so within the discovery management parameters set out 
by the District Court.  Setting out such parameters is normal for a district court, not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Birch raises several other grounds for appeal, including evidentiary objections.  
We have considered all of them and find none meritorious. 
III. Conclusion 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
